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ABSTRACT
State medical boards (SMBs) protect the public by ensuring that physicians
uphold appropriate standards of care and ethical practice. Despite this clear
purpose, egregious types of wrongdoing by physicians are alarmingly frequent,
harmful, and under-reported. Even when egregious wrongdoing is reported to
SMBs, it is unclear why SMBs sometimes fail to promptly remove seriously
offending physicians from practice. Legal and policy tools that are targeted,
well-informed, and actionable are urgently needed to help SMBs more
effectively protect patients from egregious wrongdoing by physicians.
Past reviews of SMB performance have identified features of SMBs
associated with higher rates of severe disciplinary actions against physicians,
including political and professional independence and adequate funding and
staffing. However, there has been little attention paid to elements of the statelevel legal framework that governs SMB licensing and disciplinary function, or
what legal or policy tools would make SMBs more effective at protecting patients
in serious cases.
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This Article offers solutions in the form of model language with commentary
for five high-impact statutory provisions that address board composition and
function, reporting to the board, and adjudication of disciplinary matters. It
brings together consensus recommendations from an expert panel, the results of
legal mapping of relevant state laws, and original legal and policy analysis. The
model provisions and commentary are intended to serve as a new resource for
SMBs, state legislatures, and other policymakers to encourage and support
examination of existing medical practice acts to improve SMB function and
better protect patients from harmful physicians.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

NEW LEGAL RESOURCES FOR STATE MEDICAL BOARDS

9

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 11

II. CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN
EXPERT PANEL ......................................................................................... 15
A. Selection of Legal Provisions ............................................................ 15
B. Legal Mapping Process..................................................................... 17
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................... 18
A. Board Composition and Structure .................................................... 18
B. Licensing Function ............................................................................ 19
C. Disciplinary Process ......................................................................... 20
IV. MODEL STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
AND COMMENTARY .................................................................................. 22
1. Mandate Substantive Gender Diversity
of Board Members ....................................................................... 22
2. Mandate Substantive Racial and Ethnic
Diversity of Board Members........................................................ 22
Model Language .......................................................................... 22
Existing Approaches .................................................................... 22
Commentary ................................................................................. 23
3. Authorize Effective Penalties against
Hospitals and Other Entities for Failure
to Report....................................................................................... 27
Model Language .......................................................................... 27
Existing Approaches .................................................................... 27
Commentary ................................................................................. 28
4. Require Criminal Background Checks
at Licensure Renewal ................................................................... 32
Model Language .......................................................................... 32
Existing Approaches .................................................................... 32
Commentary ................................................................................. 33
5. Establish Preponderance of the Evidence as
the Standard of Proof in Disciplinary Actions ............................. 36
Model Language .......................................................................... 36
Existing Approaches .................................................................... 36
Commentary ................................................................................. 36
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 38

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

10

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:7

TABLE 1. STATE LAWS THAT ADDRESS GENDER
DIVERSITY AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY
OF SMB MEMBERSHIP.............................................................................. 39
TABLE 2. STATE LAWS THAT AUTHORIZE PENALTIES
AGAINST HEALTH CARE ENTITIES FOR FAILURE
TO REPORT UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY
PHYSICIANS .............................................................................................. 42
TABLE 3. STATE LAWS THAT REQUIRE CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS AT INITIAL APPLICATION,
RENEWAL, OR REINSTATEMENT OF MEDICAL
LICENSE.................................................................................................... 45
TABLE 4. STATE LAWS THAT ADDRESS STANDARD OF
EVIDENCE IN SMB DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS .................................... 49

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

NEW LEGAL RESOURCES FOR STATE MEDICAL BOARDS

11

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Larry Nassar was convicted on federal child pornography charges
and multiple counts of criminal sexual misconduct under state law. 1 Nassar, a
former Michigan State University physician and USA Gymnastics team doctor,
committed thousands of sexual assaults under the guise of medical treatment
until his arrest in the summer of 2016, following an exposé published in the
Indianapolis Star. 2 For more than twenty years, girls, women, and parents raised
complaints about Nassar’s conduct to a number of authorities, including
university coaches and trainers, university police, a counselor, the Title IX
office, local police, private coaches, the USA Gymnastics Organization, and the
U.S. Olympic & Paralympic Committee. 3 Despite these reports, Nassar
continued to treat—and sexually abuse—patients until his arrest. In 2018,
Michigan State University agreed to pay $500 million to settle lawsuits brought
by 332 of Nassar’s victims. 4 The same year, the Michigan Board of Osteopathic
Medicine and Surgery permanently revoked Nassar’s license based on his 2017
convictions. 5
In 2020, Javaid Perwaiz was convicted on fifty-two counts of fraud related
to medically unnecessary hysterectomies, sterilizations, and other invasive
procedures performed over a ten-year period. 6 According to a recent in-depth
investigation, there were clear signs of Perwaiz’s behavior. 7 For at least thirtyfive years, patients filed lawsuits, nurses raised concerns, a hospital revoked his
privileges, and an insurance company identified him as an “extreme outlier” in
certain procedures. In 1984, the Virginia Board of Medicine found that Perwaiz
performed more than a dozen hysterectomies that were not medically necessary
and were contrary to the standard of care. Despite this finding, the Board elected
1. JOAN MCPHEE & JAMES P. DOWDEN, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION:
THE CONSTELLATION OF FACTORS UNDERLYING LARRY NASSAR’S ABUSE OF ATHLETES 30
(2018), https://www.nassarinvestigation.com/en.
2. Id. at 1; Tim Evans et al., Former USA Gymnastics Doctor Accused of Abuse,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/09/12/former-usa-gymnasticsdoctor-accused-abuse/89995734/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2018).
3. MCPHEE & DOWDEN, supra note 1, at 47.
4. Mitch Smith & Anemona Hartocollis, Michigan State’s $500 Million for Nassar Victims
Dwarfs Other Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/
larry-nassar-michigan-state-settlement.html.
5. LARA Permanently Revokes Nassar’s Medical License, Issues Largest Fine in Department
History, MICH. DEP’T. OF LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.michigan.gov/
lara/0,4601,7-154-11472-465774--,00.html.
6. U.S. Atty’s Off., E.D. Va., Jury Convicts Doctor of Scheme to Perform Unnecessary
Surgeries on Women, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/
jury-convicts-doctor-scheme-perform-unnecessary-surgeries-women.
7. Adrienne Mayfield et al., The Patients v. Perwaiz, WAVY.COM (2021), https://www.wavy
.com/the-patients-v-perwaiz/. The facts provided in this description are drawn from the factual
findings in this ten-part report, unless noted otherwise.
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to censure him for bad recordkeeping and “lack of judgment” in connection with
a sexual relationship with a patient but allowed him to continue seeing patients.
Patients filed similar charges with the Board in 1991 and again in 2012, but no
disciplinary action was taken. Perwaiz continued to see patients and perform
surgeries until he was charged in 2019.
In 2011, Paul Volkman was convicted on multiple federal counts of
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, including four counts that the
illegal distribution resulted in the deaths of four people. 8 When he could no
longer obtain malpractice insurance, Volkman began working at an Ohio pain
clinic in 2003 with approval from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to
prescribe controlled substances. 9 Despite complaints from physicians and
pharmacists, concerns raised during a pharmacy board inspection, raids by the
DEA and local police, and multiple patient deaths from 2003 to 2006, Volkman
continued to see patients and prescribe controlled substances until the DEA
suspended his registration in 2006. 10 The Medical Board of Ohio suspended
Volkman’s license based on the DEA’s suspension of registration, and the Board
ultimately revoked his license in December 2008. 11
These and other high-profile cases highlight the need to improve
institutional responses to reports of egregious wrongdoing by physicians. 12 This
Article focuses on the critical, yet under-examined, role of state medical boards
(SMBs) to regulate medicine and protect the public from the physicians who
commit these wrongful acts. There are seventy-one SMBs in the U.S., comprised
of one or more boards in each state, the District of Columbia, and U.S.
territories. 13 SMBs protect the public by ensuring that physicians uphold

8. Jury Convicts Physician of Illegally Prescribing Pills That Led to Deaths of Four People,
DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. (May 10, 2011), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2011/05/10/jury-con
victs-physician-illegally-prescribing-pills-led-deaths-four.
9. Volkman v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 217 (6th Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 218–19.
11. License Look-Up, ELICENSE OHIO PRO. LICENSURE, https://elicense.ohio.gov/
OH_HomePage (last visited May 31, 2021); see also Decision and Final J. Entry Affirming the
State Med. Bd. of Ohio’s Permanent Revocation of App.’s Certificate To Prac. Med. and Surgery
at 1, Paul H. Volkman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio C.P. No. 08CVF12-18288 (April 29, 2011),
https://med.ohio.gov/formala/35070722.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Shawn Hubler et al., U.S.C. Agrees to Pay $1.1 Billion to Patients of
Gynecologist Accused of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/
25/us/usc-settlement-george-tyndall.html; Explore the AJC’s Investigation of Physician Sexual
Misconduct, ATLANTA J.-CONST., http://doctors.ajc.com/table_of_contents/ (last visited Aug. 27,
2021); Samah Assad & Ron Regan, Problem Doctors Went Unchecked for Years as the Opioid
Crisis Exploded. Here’s How We Found Out., NEWS 5 ABC CLEV. (Nov. 11, 2018, 4:58 PM),
https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/investigations/problem-doctors-went-un
checked-for-years-as-the-opioid-crisis-exploded-heres-how-we-found-out.
13. Contact a State Medical Board, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., https://www.fsmb.org/
contact-a-state-medical-board/#AL (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
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appropriate standards of care and ethical practice. 14 To achieve this aim, state
laws authorize SMBs to regulate physician licensing and discipline to achieve
this aim, although there are variations among the states.
Despite this clear purpose, sexual abuse of patients and other serious types
of wrongdoing by physicians are alarmingly frequent, harmful, and underreported. This project focuses on egregious wrongdoing—which we define as a
clear violation of codes of ethics, law, or both—that directly harms patients and,
if found to be true, would merit suspension or revocation of a physician’s
medical license (e.g., sexual abuse of patients, unnecessary invasive procedures,
or improper prescribing of controlled substances). 15 Egregious forms of
wrongdoing by physicians are often not reported to SMBs. 16 Even when reported
to SMBs, boards often fail to take serious disciplinary action against
physicians. 17 Studies and investigations have found that physicians were
allowed to continue practicing medicine and continued committing egregious
offenses even after being referred to SMBs. 18 It is unclear why SMBs sometimes
fail to promptly remove seriously offending physicians from practice. This
suggests that targeted, expert-informed, and actionable legal and policy tools are
urgently needed to help SMBs more effectively protect patients from egregious
wrongdoing by physicians.

14. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 8
(2018),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trendsactions.pdf. While some state boards regulate non-physician licensees as well as physician
licensees, we focus here on board authority to address egregious wrongdoing by physicians.
15. James M. DuBois et al., Preventing Egregious Ethical Violations in Medical Practice:
Evidence-Informed Recommendations from a Multidisciplinary Working Group, 104 J. MED.
REGUL., Dec. 1, 2018, at 23, 23.
16. See James M. DuBois et al., Exploring Unnecessary Invasive Procedures in the United
States: A Retrospective Mixed-Methods Analysis of Cases from 2008-2016, 11 PATIENT SAFETY
SURGERY., 2017, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Exploring Unnecessary Invasive Procedures in the United
States]; James M. DuBois et al., A Mixed-Method Analysis of Reports on 100 Cases of Improper
Prescribing of Controlled Substances, 46 J. DRUG ISSUES 457 (2016); Gary D. Carr, Professional
Sexual Misconduct - An Overview, 44 J. MISS. STATE MED. ASS’N. 283, 285 (2003); see also Jeff
Ernsthausen, Why a National Tracking System Doesn’t Show the Extent of Physician Sexual
Misconduct, ATLANTA J.-CONST., https://doctors.ajc.com/sex_abuse_national_database/?ecmp=
doctorssexabuse_microsite_nav (last visited May 31, 2021).
17. John Alexander Harris & Elena Byhoff, Variations by State in Physician Disciplinary
Actions by US Medical Licensure Boards, 26 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 200, 200 (2017); SIDNEY
WOLFE & ROBERT E. OSHEL, PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RSCH. GRP., RANKING OF THE RATE OF
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2017-2019 11 (2021),
https://www.citizen.org/article/report-ranking-of-the-rate-of-state-medical-boards-serious-disci
plinary-actions-2017-2019/.
18. Exploring Unnecessary Invasive Procedures in the United States, supra note 16; Mayfield
et al., supra note 7; Danny Robbins, He Was Caught on Video, but Georgia Doctor Kept His
Medical License, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/caught_on_video_
but_kept_georgia_medical_license/.
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Studies show that SMBs have widely varying rates of severe disciplinary
actions against physicians (e.g., revoking a license) for similar types of
egregious wrongdoing. 19 Past reviews of SMB performance have identified
features of SMBs associated with higher rates of severe disciplinary actions
taken by boards, including political and professional independence and adequate
funding and staffing. 20 A prior study of six SMBs described how boards operate
and identified strategies for improving board disciplinary actions. 21 However,
there has been little attention paid to elements of the state-level legal framework
that governs SMB licensing and disciplinary function, or what specific legal or
policy tools would make SMBs more effective in protecting patients in serious
cases.
This Article offers solutions in the form of model language with
commentary for five high-impact statutory provisions that address improved
board composition and function, increased reporting to the board, and consistent
adjudication of disciplinary matters. The recommendations are based on an
innovative project that identified particularly effective SMB practices,
resources, and statutory provisions as well as barriers to implementing those
practices. 22 From the full findings, we selected five high-impact
recommendations appropriate for statutory analysis. The model provisions and
commentary in this Article are the first of their kind and are intended to serve as
a new resource for SMBs, state legislatures, and other policymakers to
encourage and support examination of existing medical practice acts in order to
improve SMB function and better protect patients from harmful physicians.
Part I provides an overview of the design and findings of the project, the
selection of the five provisions for this Article, and the state law mapping
process. Part II provides an overview of the legal framework governing the
operation of SMBs with a focus on the procedures and standards set by stateenabling laws (typically referred to as medical practice acts), state administrative
laws, and relevant judicial decisions. Part III presents model statutory language
with commentary for five high-impact statutory provisions that: (1) mandate
gender diversity in SMB membership; (2) mandate racial and ethnic diversity in
SMB membership; (3) authorize penalties against hospitals and other entities for
19. WOLFE & OSHEL, supra note 17, at 7, 11; Harris & Byhoff, supra note 17; SIDNEY M.
WOLFE ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RSCH. GRP., RANKING OF THE RATE OF STATE MEDICAL
BOARDS’ SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2004-2006 4 (2007), https://www.citizen.org/article/
ranking-of-state-medical-boards-serious-disciplinary-actions-2004-2006/.
20. Harris & Byhoff, supra note 17, at 206.
21. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., State Discipline of Physicians: Assessing State Medical Boards
through Case Studies, at v (Feb. 2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/private/pdf/74
616/stdiscp.pdf.
22. Tristan McIntosh et al., Protecting Patients from Egregious Wrongdoing by Physicians:
Consensus Recommendations from State Medical Board Members and Staff, J. MED. REGUL., Oct.
2021, at 5–6, 15–16.
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failure to report egregious wrongdoing by physicians; (4) require criminal
background check requirements upon renewal of a license; and (5) establish a
standard of evidence in disciplinary actions. This Part brings together the expertinformed findings of the project, analysis of existing approaches, and original
legal and policy analysis. The results of legal mapping of state approaches for
each provision are also included as tables.
II. CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN EXPERT PANEL
The purpose of our study was to identify cutting-edge and particularly
effective practices, resources, and statutory provisions that SMBs and
policymakers can adopt to better protect patients from egregious wrongdoing by
physicians. We convened a panel of SMB members and other experts, including
physicians, executive members, legal counsel, and public members from
approximately fifty percent of the seventy-one SMBs that serve the U.S., District
of Columbia, and U.S. territories. Using a modified Delphi panel, 23 expert
consensus was reached on fifty-six recommendations that were rated as highly
important for SMBs. The findings include fifty-six effective recommendations
with at least moderate or strong consensus among panelists, and seven
recommendations with weak consensus. The full findings of the modified Delphi
consensus panel are published in the Journal of Medical Regulation. 24
A.

Selection of Legal Provisions

From the full findings, we selected five, high-impact recommendations that
we believe are most appropriate for statutory analysis. The selected
recommendations are: (1) mandate gender diversity in SMB membership, (2)
mandate racial and ethnic diversity in SMB membership (these
recommendations are addressed together), (3) authorize penalties against
hospitals and other institutions for failure to report egregious wrongdoing by
physicians, (4) require criminal background check requirements upon renewal
of a license, and (5) establish the standard of proof in disciplinary actions.
We first set aside recommendations from the overall findings that SMBs
may be able to adopt without the need for state legislative or other external
government action. These recommendations will be addressed in a separate
paper. 25 For example, three recommendations address reporting of disciplinary
complaints, actions, or both in medical school and post-graduate training as a
23. See Mark J. Clayton, Delphi: A Technique to Harness Expert Opinion for Critical
Decision‐Making Tasks in Education, 17 EDUC. PSYCH. 373, 377 (1997); James M. DuBois et al.,
Curricular Priorities for Business Ethics in Medical Practice and Research: Recommendations
from Delphi Consensus Panels, 14 BMC MED. EDUC., 2014, at 2.
24. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 6.
25. Tristan McIntosh et al., What Can State Medical Boards Do To Effectively Address Serious
Ethical Violations? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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condition of licensure. 26 This information is relevant because behavior resulting
in disciplinary action during medical school is predictive of disciplinary action
by SMBs later in a physician’s career. 27 SMBs could obtain this information by
adopting a rule or practice requiring licensure applicants to disclose disciplinary
complaints, findings, or both, while in medical school and post-graduate training
and to sign a waiver permitting the board to verify the information with those
institutions. This is the practice followed by State Bars in connection with
applications for a license to practice law. 28
Because the focus of this Article is state statutory law, we also set aside
recommendations that are more likely to be adopted by a legal mechanism other
than state statutory law. Requiring information sharing between SMBs and the
Veteran’s Administration, including information about physicians, for example,
would require changes to federal policy rather than state law. 29
We deprioritized recommendations that appeared impracticable or
inadvisable. For example, one recommendation calls for raising a potentially
broad swath of misdemeanor sexual offenses to the felony level, an area of law
far outside the regulation of physicians. 30 Another recommendation suggests
routine checks of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) for
suspicious patterns of prescribing or dispensing opioids. 31 A closer examination
of emerging literature suggests this approach is unlikely to produce the desired
results and may cause other harms. 32
26. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 12. The three recommendations are: (1) “Board requires
all physicians to report any disciplinary action during medical school at the time of their application
(e.g., suspension, warning, probation, expulsion, being requested or allowed to resign in lieu of
discipline)”; (2) “Board requires medical schools and post-graduate training programs to report
egregious wrongdoing as a condition to licensure eligibility”; and (3) “Board requires medical
schools and post-graduate training programs to report any disciplinary complaints about physicians
during medical school as a condition for licensure eligibility.” Id.
27. Maxine A. Papadakis et al., Unprofessional Behavior in Medical School Is Associated with
Subsequent Disciplinary Action by a State Medical Board, 79 ACAD. MED. 244, 244 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Character and Fitness, U. OF HOUS. L. CTR., https://www.law.uh.edu/
admissions/apply-now-character-and-fitness.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2021); AM. BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2020-2021, at 504
(2020).
29. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 12; see also FSMB Calls for Improved Information
Sharing Between VA and State Medical Boards, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/news-releases/2017/2017-12-01_house_va_committee
_testimony.pdf.
30. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 11, 13.
31. Id.
32. Kelly K. Dineen, Assistant Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law, Saint
Louis University 33rd Annual Health Law Symposium, Defining Egregious Prescribing
Misconduct (Mar. 5, 2021); Jennifer D. Oliva, Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School
of Law, Saint Louis University 33rd Annual Health Law Symposium, Issues of Bias (Mar. 5, 2021);
Jennifer D. Oliva, Dosing Discrimination: Regulating PDMP Risk Scores, 110 CALI. L. REV. 47,
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Finally, we conducted preliminary legal research to verify the rate of
statutory adoption. In some cases, the verified adoption rate differs from the
panelist-reported adoption rate, which reflects perceived adoption by board
practice or policy. We also reviewed the academic and professional literature
related to SMBs and the panel recommendations, as well as comments provided
by the panelists as part of the Delphi process, for additional context.
B.

Legal Mapping Process

State laws relevant to the five recommendations were collected and coded
using policy surveillance standards. 33 The legal mapping process consisted of a
complete survey of state laws applicable to SMBs in place between June 1, 2020,
and April 1, 2021, that address each of the recommendations. The legal research
team 34 used Westlaw, LexisNexis, and SMB websites to search for current laws
in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Because the purpose was to collect
data related to SMBs, the laws were primarily drawn from state medical practice
acts. The resarch was updated through an effective date of July 1, 2021.
In accordance with quality control standards, ten states were randomly
selected to calculate reliability by completing redundant coding. Two
researchers would complete the same set of five states. Any discrepancies were
discussed and resolved. Results tended to show very high reliability (uniform
answers between both researchers), ranging from ninety percent to one hundred
percent across the coded variables. If the overall rate of divergence or nonuniform responses of the first ten states were above five percent, the teams would
continue redundant coding until the overall rate fell below five percent and
created a reliability rate that was greater than ninety-five percent. Divergences
were examined by the supervising researcher and resolved within the data set.
The full text of each statute or rule was coded and collected in one step.
MonQcle data software 35 was used to code the laws and organize the mapping
information. The final list of variables included dichotomous or categorical
questions measuring whether states address each of the factors above and, if so,
what requirements did the policies include, if any.

50–51, 85–107 (2022) (offering a data science critique of PDMP risk scoring methodology and
evaluation of its impact on marginalized patients).
33. See generally Scott Burris et al., Policy Surveillance: A Vital Public Health Practice
Comes of Age, 41 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L. 1151, 1151–73 (2016).
34. Many thanks to Jessie Bekker (J.D., MHA anticipated, May 2023), Darian Diepholz,
MBA, MPH, CHES (J.D. anticipated, May 2022), Caro Haglof (J.D. anticipated, May 2023), Julia
McFarland (J.D. May 2021), and Maddy Quoss (J.D. May 2021) for excellent work on the legal
mapping process.
35. Ctr. for Pub. Health L. Rsch., Home, MONQCLE, https://monqcle.com/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2021).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are seventy-one SMBs in the U.S., comprised of one or more boards
in each state, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. 36 SMBs protect the
public by ensuring that physicians are competent and adhere to appropriate
standards of care and ethical guidelines. 37 Similar to other administrative bodies,
SMBs are governed by procedures and standards set by state-enabling laws
(typically referred to as medical practice acts), state administrative laws, and
relevant judicial decisions. State medical practice acts authorize SMBs to
regulate the practice of medicine and administer physician licensing and
disciplinary processes. In almost all states, SMBs are authorized to adopt
policies, rules, and regulations related to medical practice necessary to achieve
these goals. 38 Although there is variation among the states, this Part provides an
overview of that legal framework.
A.

Board Composition and Structure

Boards vary in size, composition, and structure. 39 They range in size from
as large as twenty-one members in Connecticut and Washington to as small as
five members in Vermont and New Mexico. 40 According to the Federation of
State Medical Boards (FSMB), factors to be considered in determining the size
of a SMB include the number of physicians in the state, the composition and
function of the SMBs’ committees, and the ability to separate prosecutorial and
judicial powers within the SMB. 41 The FSMB also advises the size of the board
should be sufficient to allow for recusals due to conflicts of interest and absences
without hindering final decisions. 42
State law governs the size and composition of SMBs and provides
requirements for board membership. Composition requirements can include
board size, number of allopathic and osteopathic physicians, number of public

36. Contact A State Medical Board, supra note 13.
37. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 7–8, 18.
38. These rules are generally published on a SMB’s website and may be codified state code.
See, e.g., Administrative Rules, ALA. BD. MED. EXAM’RS & MED. LICENSURE COMM’N,
https://www.albme.org/resources/legal/rules/ (last visited June 1, 2021); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r.
540-X-1-.07 (2018); U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 50.
39. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 6.
40. Id. at 47 (number of board members for Vermont and New Mexico reflect Osteopathic
Medical Boards).
41. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., ELEMENTS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC
BOARD 7 (2015), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/elements-modern-medicalboard.pdf.
42. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., GUIDELINES FOR THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF A
STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC BOARD 16 (2021), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/
advocacy/policies/guidelines-for-the-structure-and-function-of-a-state-medical-and-osteopathicboard.pdf.
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members, and the gender, geographical, and racial diversity of board members. 43
SMB members are “typically . . . volunteer physicians and members of the
public who are, in most cases, appointed by the governor.” 44 However, state
medical societies and organizations often suggest candidates. 45
SMBs are authorized to issue licenses for the general practice of medicine
and to investigate and discipline physicians who engage in professional
misconduct. Some states have separate medical boards for licensing and
disciplining functions, while other states have a single board that performs both
functions. For example, Illinois has a Medical Disciplinary Board and a Medical
Licensing Board. 46 In comparison, Ohio has one medical board that possesses
authority for both licensing and discipline. 47 In addition, some SMBs are
independent and possess all licensing and disciplinary authority, while others
are part of a larger agency. 48 Most boards also have access to administrative
staff, including investigators, licensing specialists, and legal counsel, who may
be shared with other state regulatory agencies. 49
B.

Licensing Function

SMBs establish requirements to practice medicine in their specific
jurisdictions. Licensing standards ensure that physicians have the required
education and training and that they adhere to standards of professional
conduct. 50 Generally, physicians must verify their education, training, and work
history, and must disclose any information that may affect their ability to
practice competently and ethically, such as criminal convictions, malpractice
resolutions, and relevant health conditions. 51 For example, as discussed in the
next Part, the majority of states require a criminal background check at the time
of initial licensure application as a matter of state law or board policy. In
participating states, physicians can apply for licensure through the Interstate
Medical Licensure Compact to streamline the process of applying in multiple
states. 52
43. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., BOARD COMPOSITION: BOARD-BY-BOARD OVERVIEW
(2019), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/key-issues/state-medical-board-composi
tion.pdf; see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 69.16(A), (C) (2009).
44. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 21; U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra
note 14, at 6.
45. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1263
(2018); see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 21.
46. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/7 (2014); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/8 (2011).
47. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.01 (West 1990).
48. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. A Faster Pathway to Physician Licensure, INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT,
https://www.imlcc.org/a-faster-pathway-to-physician-licensure/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

20

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:7

SMBs also evaluate applications of license renewals, typically every one to
two years. 53 The renewal process generally requires physicians to show that they
have maintained standards of medical practice and ethics, have engaged in
continuing medical education, and have not engaged in improper conduct. 54
C. Disciplinary Process
The majority of SMB time and resources are spent on physician disciplinary
issues. 55 Physician disciplinary actions are administrative proceedings. They are
distinct from civil malpractice actions (a lawsuit seeking damages for medical
care that falls below the standard of care) and criminal prosecutions (prosecution
of a defendant for criminal behavior), though the same conduct by a physician
may form the basis of more than one type of action.
The physician discipline process is primarily complaint-driven. 56 The
majority of complaints are made by patients and their families, 57 although boards
also receive information from other SMBs, hospitals and health care
organizations, other government agencies, and malpractice insurers. 58
Complaints are screened to determine if they fall under the board’s legal
jurisdiction. State law defines grounds for physician discipline, which generally
include failure to meet accepted standard of care, sexual misconduct, improper
prescribing, substance use disorders, felony convictions, and fraud. 59
If the complaint is within the board’s jurisdiction, the complaint is
prioritized for investigation. 60 If the board determines there is imminent danger
to the public, it may immediately suspend the physician’s license pending
investigation. 61 The board investigates the facts behind the complaint by
gathering records and speaking to the individuals involved. Consistent with due
process requirements, the physician is notified of the charges. In cases involving
standard of care issues, medical review may be appropriate. 62 In some cases, a
board may bring in “an expert with professional credentials in the same specialty
as the physician in question . . . to provide an additional opinion about the care
provided.” 63

53. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 21, at vi.
56. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 21, at 21.
57. Id.
58. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14.
59. Id.; Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline,
13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 288, 293 (2010).
60. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Based on the results of the investigation, boards generally have a variety of
options under state law. 64 For less serious offenses, for example, the board may
issue a letter of concern to the physician (which is typically private), require an
appearance before the board, or dismiss the complaint without formal action. In
serious cases, the board may file a formal complaint against the physician,
leading to disciplinary action (which are typically public).
If the board files a formal complaint, the next step is to schedule a hearing
before all or part of the board or, in some states, a hearing officer or
administrative law judge. 65 At the hearing, evidence and witnesses are
presented. Due process requirements such as the right to an impartial decision
maker(s), the right to present evidence, and the right to question adverse
witnesses must be observed. 66 Cases may be settled prior to the conclusion of
the hearing by agreement of the board and the physician. If the case is not settled,
it proceeds to adjudication. The standard of proof or level of evidence required
for the board to find a violation has occurred is typically by a “preponderance of
evidence” or, less commonly, by “clear and convincing evidence.” 67 If a board
finds that a violation has occurred and takes disciplinary action, the information
becomes part of the physician’s public, professional record and is shared with
other SMBs. 68
Physicians have the right to appeal the final decision of the board in state
court. 69 Grounds for appeal may include failure to provide due process, unequal
treatment compared to others in a similar situation, or bias. 70 To obtain judicial
review, courts have stated that one must first exhaust any administrative
remedies available before bringing the suit to federal court. 71 For example, under
California law, a physician may petition the SMB for reconsideration up to thirty
days after the decision was made. 72 The state court reviews the final decision of
the board, which will be upheld unless the court finds that the decision is not

64. Id.
65. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 43.
68. Id. at 11.
69. See, e.g., Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 72 A.3d 1034, 1037–38 (Conn. 2013).
70. Valarie Blake, Home or Hospital—Your Medical Board Is Watching, 13 AMA J. ETHICS
707, 709–10 (2011) (discussing grounds for appeal). For more on due process claims, see also
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 335 (1976) (creating a three-part balancing test to evaluate
the constitutional adequacy of administrative procedures for due process claims); see also Jones,
72 A.3d at 1040; Firman v. Dep’t of State, State Bd. of Med., 697 A.2d 291, 295 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1997).
71. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 156 (1992).
72. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11521(a) (West 2005); see also Medical Board of California: The
Enforcement Process, MED. BD. OF CAL. (Jan. 2019), https://www.mbc.ca.gov/Download/Docu
ments/enforcement-process.pdf; Bonnell v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 82 P.3d 740, 742 (Cal. 2003).
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supported by substantial evidence. 73 This is a deferential standard of review used
when courts review agency interpretations. 74
IV. MODEL STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND COMMENTARY
This Part offers model statutory language with commentary for five highimpact statutory provisions that address board composition and function,
reporting relevant information to the board, and adjudication of disciplinary
matters. It brings together the expert-informed findings of the project, with legal
and policy analysis. The commentary includes a clear and concise explanation
of the statutory language, including the purpose and justification for the
provision, references to approaches taken by the states identified by legal
mapping and supporting research, as appropriate. The results of legal mapping
of state approaches for each provision are also included as tables. For areas in
which more than one approach may support expert consensus or where
variations may be desirable, an explanation is provided.
1. Mandate Substantive Gender Diversity of Board Members
2. Mandate Substantive Racial and Ethnic Diversity of Board Members
Model Language
Section 101. Diversity of members of state medical boards
(1) To the extent practicable, the members appointed to the state medical
board(s) authorized to issue a license, address professional misconduct, or both
shall reflect the geographic, racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of the State.
Existing Approaches
The model language reflects existing approaches to a range of demographic
factors, qualifying language, and reference to the demographic composition of
the state. It is also in keeping with existing laws that govern other aspects of
board composition, such as geographic diversity and diversity of medical
specialty.
As shown in Table 1, eight states have statutory language applicable to
SMBs that addresses gender diversity, and eight states have statutory provisions
that address racial and ethnic diversity with respect to SMBs. The approaches
taken by these states vary. Six states combine references to diversity based on
gender, race and ethnicity, and other characteristics in a single statutory
provision. For example, Maryland requires that SMB composition reflect the
73. See, e.g., Fisch v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 769 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (Mass. 2002); Gray
v. Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 102 N.E.3d 917, 923–24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); IND. CODE § 4-21.55-14(b), (d)(5) (1987).
74. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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geographic, racial, ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity of the state, to the extent
possible. Other states address diversity based on gender (North Dakota and
Iowa) or race and ethnicity (Oregon and Louisiana), but not both.
The intended outcome of these statutory provisions also varies. Four states
seek composition of SMB membership that reflects the composition of the state
population (Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, and North Carolina), while a fifth
refers to the composition of the population qualified to serve (North Dakota).
Three states seek “balanced” boards, without defining what is meant by that term
(Iowa, North Dakota, and Oregon). Finally, one state requires, to the extent
feasible, the appointment of at least one woman and at least one AfricanAmerican person (Tennessee).
Three other states require consideration of diversity in some form but focus
on the nomination or appointment process rather than the outcome. One state
requires, to the extent possible, the governor to take affirmative steps to appoint
women and “members of minority groups” (Missouri), and another requires the
appointing authorities to consider recommendations from “minority healthrelated professional associations” (Arkansas). Finally, one state targets the
nomination process, requiring the list of nominations prepared for the governor
to regularly include at least one “minority appointee” (Louisiana).
Commentary
There are several reasons to support gender, racial and ethnic, and other
types of diversity in state board membership (e.g., equality of opportunity,
representation, impartiality). 75 In keeping with the purpose of the project, this
Article focuses on the impact of diversity on SMB ability to address egregious
wrongdoing by physicians. It is also important to establish diversity
requirements as a matter of law, rather than solely as a SMB policy or practice.
In many states, SMB members are appointed by the governor or a nominating
committee through a formal process that relies on nominations from state
medical organizations, SMBs, and other sources. 76
Professional organizations and experts have called for diversity in SMB
membership to improve board function. In May 2020, the FSMB adopted a new
Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct that addresses diversity in terms of board function. 77 In a section
titled “Implicit Bias,” the report states that “[d]iverse representation on state

75. See, e.g., Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms,
94 IND. L.J. 145, 159–64 (2019).
76. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 42, 49.
77. Fed’n of State Med. Bds., Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on
Physician Sexual Misconduct, J. MED. REGUL., July 2020, at 17–36.
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medical boards in terms of gender, age, and ethnicity is important for ensuring
balanced discussion and decisions.” 78 The section provides:
In any case that comes before a state medical board, it is important for those
responsible for adjudicating the case to be mindful of any personal bias that may
impact their review and adjudication. . . . Training about implicit bias is
recommended for board members and staff in order to help identify implicit bias
and mitigate the impact it may have on their work. 79

Medical sociologist Ruth Horowitz also addressed the value of diverse SMB
membership in her influential account of her experience as a public member of
two SMBs and her observations of two other SMBs. 80 She recommended that
members of the board be nominated through an open process and selected to
“highlight diversity, including regional, ethnic, and gender diversity, and various
medical specialties among board members.” 81 More recently, the FSMB called
for diversity, equity, and inclusion in state board membership and staff to further
its commitment to an equitable health care system that addresses structural
inequalities and racism in medicine, health care, and medical regulation. 82
Identifying and addressing implicit bias is important throughout the
disciplinary process. The FSMB report highlights the impact of implicit bias in
cases involving allegations of sexual misconduct. 83 Other research highlights the
impact of implicit bias in cases involving allegations of improper prescribing. 84
Finally, studies of disciplinary complaints filed against attorneys suggest that
there may be bias in the type of patients who file complaints and the physician
against whom complaints are filed. 85 In addition to mandating diversity, SMBs
should require all members to go through formal training and adopt formal
practices to minimize the impact of implicit bias.
The positive impact of diversity on group performance is supported by
research in other fields. Studies have highlighted that diverse teams may lead to
improved and more accurate group thinking, including a more careful and

78. Id. at 25.
79. Id.
80. RUTH HOROWITZ, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: MEDICAL LICENSING AND THE
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 4 (Rima D. Apple & Janet Golden eds., 2012).
81. Id. at 181–82.
82. FSMB Statement on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Medical Regulation and Health
Care, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.fsmb.org/advocacy/newsreleases/fsmb-statement-on-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-in-medical-regulation-and-healthcare/.
83. See Patricia A. King et al., Contextualizing and Strengthening State Medical Board
Responses to Physician Sexual Misconduct: Recommendations from the Federation of State
Medical Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 151, 166 (2022).
84. See sources cited supra note 32.
85. Lissa L. Broome & John M. Conley, Diversity from the Perspective of Corporate Boards
and Lawyer Disciplinary Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 138 (2022).
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deliberative focus on the available facts. 86 In addition, a growing number of
studies have linked gender-diverse corporate boards with improved group
decision-making and governance. 87
The model language calls for SMB membership to reasonably reflect the
diversity of the state population. 88 Given the well-documented lack of diversity
in medicine, 89 the general population of the state may be more diverse than the
population of licensed physicians. For example, though about thirteen percent
of the U.S. population is Black, only about five percent of physicians are
Black. 90
Still, based on surveys of licensed physicians, the diversity target in the
model language is feasible. In terms of gender, according to a national survey
conducted by the FSMB, 36.2% of state licensees identified as women in 2020. 91
Representation ranged from a low of 26% (Wyoming and Utah) to a high of
42.5% (Massachusetts). 92 In addition, female physicians outnumbered their
male counterparts in younger physician cohorts, 93 suggesting a recent shift
toward equitable gender representation in the physician workforce. In terms of
race and ethnicity, a national survey conducted by the Association of American
Medical Colleges in 2018 found that more than half (56.2%) of active physicians
were white. 94 Physicians who identified as Asian made up the second-largest
group (17.1%), followed by Hispanic physicians (5.8%) and Black or African

86. David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4,
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter. But see Kimberly D. Krawiec et al.,
The Danger of Difference: Tensions in Directors’ View of Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 919, 920–21, 925, 948 (2013).
87. Nili, supra note 75, at 160; Broome & Conley, supra note 85, at 142–43.
88. State population data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey distributed
by sex can be found at Population Distribution by Sex, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-sex/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2021); State
population data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey by race/ethnicity can be
found at Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/
other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
89. May Lee & John L. Coulehan, Medical Students’ Perceptions of Racial Diversity and
Gender Equality, 40 MED. EDUC. 691, 691, 694–95 (2006); see also LISA M. MEEKS & NEERA R.
JAIN, ACCESSIBILITY, INCLUSION, AND ACTION IN MEDICAL EDUCATION: LIVED EXPERIENCES OF
LEARNERS AND PHYSICIANS WITH DISABILITIES 8–9 (Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 2018).
90. Valerie Montgomery Rice, Diversity in Medical Schools: A Much-Needed New Beginning,
325 JAMA 23, 23 (2021).
91. Physician Census: Interactive Census Map, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS.,
https://www.fsmb.org/physician-census/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
92. Id.
93. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., DIVERSITY IN MEDICINE: FACTS AND FIGURES 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2019).
94. Diversity in Medicine: Facts and Figures 2019, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., https://www.aa
mc.org/data-reports/workforce/interactive-data/figure-18-percentage-all-active-physicians-race
/ethnicity-2018 (last updated July 1, 2019)
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American physicians (5.0%). 95 The survey noted, however, that 13.7% of
physicians—the third largest subgroup—were of an unknown race. 96 It may be
helpful to partner with organizations that advocate for greater diversity in
medicine to capitalize on existing diversity, especially in states where the
population of licensed physicians is significantly less diverse than the general
population of the state. 97
The diversity requirements reflected in the model language are not strict
mandates because they are tempered by qualifying language (e.g., “to the extent
possible”). This could be coupled with a requirement to disclose current board
diversity, an explanation from the appointing authority (typically the governor)
if the diversity target is not met, or both.98 Disclosure and explanation would be
valuable, as we do not have data on existing diversity in SMB membership
across the country.
States may choose to apply diversity requirements beyond the SMB.
Maryland’s statute, for example, applies to each health occupations board
authorized to issue a license or certificate. 99 States may also choose to require
additional forms of diversity, such as cultural diversity, 100 disability diversity,
or inclusion of board members who identify as LGBTQ+.
Finally, attention should be paid to the intersection of different kinds of
diversity in SMB membership. The research on diversity in corporate
governance suggests that more attention should be paid to “substantive gender
diversity,” meaning a real opportunity to make an impact, rather than simple
minimum representation. 101 For example, most states require that SMBs include
one or more public members. 102 However, public members have a wide range
of authority and influence—some may not be voting members or may not play
a robust role in disciplinary functions. 103 If individuals appointed as public
members also serve as diverse members, the benefits of diversity for the SMB
as a group may not be fully realized.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Broome & Conley, supra note 85, at 148.
98. Id.
99. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-214 (West 2010).
100. Id.
101. Nili, supra note 75, at 164.
102. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 6.
103. See David A. Johnson et al., The Role and Value of Public Members in Health Care
Regulatory Governance, 94 ACAD. MED. 182, 184 (2019); HOROWITZ, supra note 80, at 18.
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3. Authorize Effective Penalties against Hospitals and Other Entities for
Failure to Report
Model Language
Section 102. Penalties for Failure to Report
(1) A willful failure to file the report described in [section(s) addressing
reporting requirements] shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) per violation, that shall be paid by the health care
facility or other entity subject to the reporting requirements addressed in
[section(s)]. The fine may be imposed in any civil or administrative action or
proceeding brought by or on behalf of any agency having regulatory jurisdiction
over the licensee regarding whom the report was or should have been filed. The
fine shall be paid to that agency, but not expended until appropriated by the
legislature. A violation of this subdivision may constitute reportable
unprofessional conduct by the licensee. As used in this subdivision, “willful”
means a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty.
(2) Except as provided in section (1), any failure to file the report described in
[section(s) addressing reporting requirements] is punishable by a fine, not to
exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) per violation, that shall be paid by the
health care facility or other entity subject to [section(s)]. The fine may be
imposed in any civil or administrative action or proceeding brought by or on
behalf of any agency having regulatory jurisdiction over the person regarding
whom the report was or should have been filed. The fine shall be paid to that
agency, but not expended until appropriated by the legislature.
Existing Approaches
As shown in Table 2, twenty-four states have statutory language authorizing
fines against hospitals and other institutions for failure to report unprofessional
conduct by physicians. The amount of the fines authorized varies from $500 to
$100,000 per initial failure to report. At least three states authorize higher fines
for subsequent failures to report (Delaware, Florida, and Nebraska), and one
state imposes a fine per day that the event is not reported (Kansas).
Fines may also vary based on the size of the reporting entity. In Vermont,
for example, required reporters, including hospitals where licensees provide
professional services, must report any “reportable disciplinary action” to the
state board. 104 A violation of the statute triggers “a civil penalty of not more than
$5,000.00, provided that a reporter who employs or grants privileges to five or
more board licensees and who violates this section shall be subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $10,000.00.” 105
104. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1317(a) (2020).
105. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1317(f) (2020).
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In most states, the fine is triggered by any failure to report, and several states
specifically include entities that “neglect” to report.106 The model language is
patterned in part on California’s statute, which provides higher fines for
“willful” violations. 107
Commentary
Nearly all states require hospitals and other health care organizations within
the state to report possible violation(s) of the state medical practice act or SMB
rules and regulations by a licensed physician. 108 These legal requirements reflect
the critical importance of information about possible violations of the state
medical practice act to the ability of SMBs to take action and protect the
public. 109 The requirements also reflect the fact that hospitals and other health
care organizations have access to critical information such as hospital
disciplinary actions and peer review actions that are often unavailable to SMBs
unless reported. 110
Despite mandatory reporting laws, failure to detect and report physician
wrongdoing on the part of hospitals and other health care entities is a
longstanding problem. 111 The FSMB has repeatedly identified underreporting as
a serious obstacle to effective SMB oversight of physicians that severely limits
the ability of SMBs to protect patients. The FSMB’s 2016 Position Statement on
Duty to Report notes that hospitals and health organizations “regularly ignore
reporting requirements, find ways to circumvent them, or provide reports that
are too brief and general to equip the board with relevant information.” 112 In
some instances, failures to report have resulted in avoidable harms to patients. 113
There are practical and organizational reasons that hospitals and other health
care entities fail to report wrongdoing by affiliated physicians. 114 Risks to public

106. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1,127(3) (2011) (“[F]ails or neglects to make a report or
provide information as required under this section[.]”).
107. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805(k) (West 2021); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805.8(d)
(West 2021).
108. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 8, 61.
109. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., POSITION STATEMENT ON DUTY TO REPORT 1 (2016),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/position-statement-on-duty-to-report.pdf.
110. ALAN LEVINE ET AL., STATE MEDICAL BOARDS FAIL TO DISCIPLINE DOCTORS WITH
HOSPITAL ACTIONS AGAINST THEM 2, 15 (PUB. CITIZEN, 2011), https://www.citizen.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/1937.pdf (“Hospital disciplinary reports are peer review actions that are one of the
most important sources of information for [SMB] oversight.”).
111. POSITION STATEMENT ON DUTY TO REPORT, supra note 109, at 2; LEVINE ET AL., supra
note 110, at 3; HOROWITZ, supra note 80, at 123.
112. POSITION STATEMENT ON DUTY TO REPORT, supra note 109, at 2.
113. Id.
114. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., DUTY TO REPORT: PROTECTING PATIENTS BY IMPROVING
THE REPORTING AND SHARING OF INFORMATION ABOUT HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS (2017),
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reputation and financial standing are frequently cited as disincentives to
reporting, 115 and there is often a lack of consequences for failure to report.
Authorization of fines for failure to report is a way to change these incentives,
especially if the fines are substantial and made public. Professional
organizations and experts have called for fines against hospitals and other health
care entities for failure to report. 116 The FSMB’s 2016 Position Statement on
Duty to Report, for example, has recommended that civil penalties be authorized
and imposed in cases of institutional failure to report physician wrongdoing. 117
Review of state statutory language authorizing penalties for failure to report
is also an opportunity to assess other elements of the reporting requirement. The
law should include an inclusive definition of the individuals and entities that are
required to report. 118 The FSMB provides sample language that identifies a
broad range of individuals and entities, including: all licensees; the state medical
associations and their components; all hospitals and other health care
organizations in the state, including hospitals, medical centers, long-term care
facilities, managed care organizations, ambulatory surgery centers, clinics,
group practices, and coroners; all chiefs of staff, medical directors, department
administrators, service directors, attending physicians, and residency directors;
all local medical/osteopathic societies and local professional societies; all state
agencies; all peer review bodies in the state; and resident training program
directors. 119 California’s law identifies a similarly broad range of required
reporters, as does the District of Columbia. 120 In addition to any licensed or
exempt clinic or health facility and any postsecondary educational institutions,
D.C.’s law includes:

https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/duty-to-report-summary.pdf; Report and
Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct, supra note 77.
115. DUTY TO REPORT: PROTECTING PATIENTS BY IMPROVING THE REPORTING AND SHARING
OF INFORMATION ABOUT HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 114, at 5; Report and
Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct, supra note 77; FED’N
OF STATE MED. BDS., ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT 21
(2015), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/essentials-of-a-state-medical-and-oste
opathic-practice-act.pdf.
116. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 77; ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT, supra note
115, at 28; ALAN LEVINE & SIDNEY WOLFE, HOSPITALS DROP THE BALL ON PHYSICIAN
OVERSIGHT: FAILURE OF HOSPITALS TO DISCIPLINE AND REPORT DOCTORS ENDANGERS
PATIENTS 17 (Pub. Citizen eds., 2009), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration
/18731.pdf.
117. POSITION STATEMENT ON DUTY TO REPORT, supra note 109, at 2; Report and
Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct, supra note 77.
118. See ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT, supra note
115, at 26–27.
119. Id.
120. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805 (West 2021).
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. . . an individual or entity licensed or otherwise authorized under District law to
provide healthcare service, including a hospital, nursing facility, comprehensive
outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice program, renal
dialysis facility, ambulatory surgical center, pharmacy, physician or health care
practitioner’s office, long-term care facility, behavior health residential
treatment facility, health clinic, clinical laboratory, health center, physician,
physician assistant, nurse practitioner, clinical nurse specialist, certified
registered nurse anesthetist, certified nurse midwife, psychologist, certified
social worker, registered dietitian or nutrition professional, physical or
occupational therapist, pharmacist, or other individual health care
practitioner. 121

State statutes should also clearly define the information that must be
reported promptly in writing, which should include: any possible violation of the
state medical practice act or the SMB’s rules and regulations; any restriction,
limitation, loss, or denial of a licensee’s staff privileges or membership that
involves patient care; any voluntary resignation from the staff of a health care
organization or any voluntary limitation of staff privileges; and a report of each
final judgment, settlement, arbitration award, or any form of payment made by
the licensee or on the licensee’s behalf by any source upon any demand, claim,
or case alleging medical malpractice, battery, incompetence, or failure of
informed consent. 122
Some states establish a threshold for reporting, such as “actual knowledge”
of misconduct or “reasonable cause” to believe misconduct has occurred. 123
However, circumvention of reporting requirements by hospitals and academic
medical centers suggest that all reports of misconduct, and all disciplinary
actions or arrangements should be reported. State statutes may also include
language providing immunity from civil or criminal liability or disciplinary
action for reports made in good faith. 124
Statutes could specify the factors to be considered in determining the amount
of the fine imposed in the statute, regulations, or board rule. California, for
121. D.C. CODE § 7-161(a)(2)–(3) (2009).
122. ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT, supra note 115, at
26–27; see also ALA. CODE § 34-24-59 (2002) (“The chief administrative officer of each hospital
shall report to the Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners any disciplinary action taken
concerning any physician when the action is related to professional ethics, negligence, or
incompetence in the practice of medicine, moral turpitude, sexual misconduct, abusive or disruptive
behavior, or drug or alcohol abuse. Disciplinary action shall include termination, revocation,
probation, restriction, denial, failure to renew, suspension, reduction, or resignation of hospital
privileges for any of the above reasons. The report shall be in writing and be made within 30 days
of the date of the initial action.”).
123. See Kristopher T. Starr, Reporting a Physician Colleague for Unsafe Practice: What’s the
Law?, 46 NURSING 14, 14 (2016).
124. ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT, supra note 115, at
28.
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example, provides that the amount of the fine shall be proportional to the severity
of the failure to report and differ based upon these factors:
. . . written findings, including whether the failure to file caused harm to a patient
or created a risk to patient safety; whether any person who is designated or
otherwise required by law to file the report required under this section exercised
due diligence despite the failure to file or whether the person knew or should
have known that a report required under this section would not be filed; whether
there has been a prior failure to file a report required under this section; and
whether a report was filed with another state agency or law enforcement. 125

Some states may want to consider alternative approaches instead of or in
addition to the authorization of fines. For example, organizational accreditation
and licensing processes are focused on patient safety and quality of care and may
be leveraged to encourage hospitals, academic medical centers, and other health
care organizations to report unprofessional physician conduct. 126 The Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) mandates accreditation by an
approved accrediting organization or state agency as a requirement for
participation in its programs. 127 The Joint Commission is the most prevalent
accreditation organization, 128 and states could encourage regular review of
reporting practices and records as part of private Joint Commission
accreditation. Similarly, states could require review of reporting by hospitals and
other health care institutions as part of the state licensing process. 129 States could
work with the accreditation authorities to apply a similar requirement to
universities and medical schools that would apply to conduct by affiliated
physicians who practice outside of an academic medical center (e.g., an athletic
department).

125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805.8(e) (West 2021).
126. Hema N. Viswanathan & J. Warren Salmon, Accrediting Organizations and Quality
Improvement, 6 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 1117, 1120, 1122 (2000); see also Nadia N. Sawicki, State
Peer Review Laws as a Tool To Incentivize Reporting to Medical Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 97, 117 (2022) (arguing that states could make peer review immunity
contingent on compliance with state medical practice act reporting requirements).
127. Conditions for Coverage (CfCs) & Conditions of Participation (CoPs), CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CFCs
AndCoPs (last visited Aug. 28, 2021).
128. Miranda B. Lam et al., Association Between Patient Outcomes and Accreditation in US
Hospitals: Observational Study, 363 BMJ, 2018, at 1, 2.
129. Others have suggested that federal law should permit CMS to stop reimbursing hospitals
if they failed to report disciplinary actions against physicians. LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 116,
at 31–34.
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4. Require Criminal Background Checks at Licensure Renewal
Model Language
Section 103. Requirements for License issued by the State Medical Board
(1) All applicants for a license or renewal or reinstatement of a license issued by
the [State Medical Board] shall submit to a state and national criminal history
background check by providing fingerprints and executing a criminal history
information release using forms provided by the Board.
(2) Fingerprints provided by each applicant shall be submitted to the
[appropriate state entity], which is responsible for forwarding the fingerprints to
the [appropriate state entity] for a state criminal history check and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check.
(3) Information received by the Board pursuant to a criminal history background
check shall be confidential, except that such information received by and relied
upon by the Board in denying the issuance of a certificate of qualification may
be disclosed as may be necessary to support the denial.
Existing Approaches
As shown in Table 3, twelve states require physicians to complete a criminal
background check (CBC) at the time of renewal. Two additional states require
the board to regularly review CBC information independent of the renewal
requirements. Delaware requires review of the criminal history of all licensed
physicians at least every six months. 130 In contrast, Washington requires an
annual review of a representative sample of all license holders. 131
A majority of states with CBC requirements require both state and national
CBCs, which is reflected in the model language.132 A state-level background
check generally includes infractions, misdemeanors, felony convictions, and
pending criminal cases reported in databases at the state and county level within
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1723(e) (West 2011) (“The Division shall review the criminal
history of all individuals licensed to practice medicine on a periodic basis, at a minimum, once
every 6 months.”).
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.064(5) (2008) (“The secretary shall conduct an annual review
of a representative sample of all license holders who have previously obtained a background check
through the department. The selection of the license holders to be reviewed must be representative
of all categories of license holders and geographic locations.”).
132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-306(a)(1) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1720(b)(6) (2017);
FLA. STAT. § 456.039(4)(a)–(b) (2015); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-316(g)(1) (West
2020); see also MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-308.1(c) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45:1-29 (West 2005); N.M. CODE R. § 16.10.7.9 (LexisNexis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.265(9)
(2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1353(8) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.064(2) (2008). See
also Criminal Background Checks: Board-by-Board Overview, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS.,
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/key-issues/criminal-background-checks-by-state2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
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a single state. A national CBC, which the FBI can conduct, 133 includes the same
information reported in databases at the state and county level across the
country.
Commentary
The FSMB, consumer advocacy organizations, and other entities have stated
that SMBs should have greater access to reliable information from other sources,
including the criminal justice system. 134 Access to this information on a timely
basis is especially important considering studies finding that physicians who
engage in serious ethical violations—a category that overlaps with criminal
conduct under state law—often reoffend. 135 In some cases, physicians were able
to relocate and continue offending, 136 underscoring the need for criminal history
information from other states. CBCs are relatively inexpensive and may be
added to application fees, 137 although they may impose burdens on boards with
less administrative support.
Public and private entities have widely adopted CBCs as a method of
regulating physicians and protecting the public. As shown in Table 3, thirty-four
states require a CBC at the time of initial application for a medical license. At
least seven additional SMBs require a CBC upon initial application as a matter
of board practice or policy. 138 A few additional states participate in the Interstate
133. Identity History Summary Checks, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov
/services/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks (last visited Mar 29, 2021).
134. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 14, at 9; WOLFE ET AL.,
supra note 19.
135. Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician
Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L. 867, 868, 882 (2007); James
M. DuBois et al., Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine: A Statistical and Ethical Analysis of 280
Cases in the United States From 2008–2016, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 24, 2019, at 16, 17–18.
136. DuBois et al., supra note 135, at 16, 27–28; Robbins, supra note 18.
137. See, e.g., Background Checks, TN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, https://www.tn.gov/
tbi/divisions/cjis-division/background-checks.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (citing cost of fifty
dollars for a national CBC); Background Checks, STATE OF R.I., OFF. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.riag.ri.gov/homeboxes/BackgroundChecks.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (citing the
national CBC costs thirty-five dollars); Identity History Summary Checks, supra note 133 (listing
the cost to run an Identity History Summary Check at eighteen dollars).
138. See Kansas Licensure Application Instructions Medicine & Surgery (MD) and
Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery (DO), KAN. STATE BD. OF HEALING ARTS, http://www.ksbha
.org/forms/md_do_app_nonfill.pdf (last revised May 2016); Requirements for Medical Licensure,
ME. BD. OF LICENSURE IN MED., https://www.maine.gov/md/sites/maine.gov.md/files/inlinefiles/requirements2017.pdf (last revised Feb. 1, 2018); Instructions/Application, N.D. BD. OF MED.,
https://www.ndbom.org/practitioners/physicians/newapp/app-instructions.asp (last visited Sept.
15, 2021); Medical Professional Resources: MD Application Instructions, OKLA. BD. OF MED.
LICENSURE & SUPERVISION, https://www.okmedicalboard.org/resources (last revised Aug. 2021);
Pennsylvania Licensing System, COMMONWEALTH OF PA. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.pals.pa
.gov/# (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). To access checklist, first select “application checklist,” then
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Medical Licensure Compact, which requires a national CBC and excludes
physicians with any criminal history from participation. 139 Finally, sixteen states
require physicians to complete a CBC as a condition of license reinstatement.
The model language can be adapted to amend existing requirements in these
states.
Many medical students are subject to background checks in the application
process and during medical school. The American Medical College Application
Service (AMCAS) works with affiliated medical schools to facilitate a
background check. 140 Only ten medical schools, eight of which are Texas
schools affiliated with the Texas Medical and Dental Schools Application
Service (TMDSAS), do not use the AMCAS service. 141 Such background checks
are extensive and include records searches from county, state, and federal
databases. 142 TMDSAS noted in its most recent application year handbook that
universities may also impose their own background check requirements for
medical and other health sciences students. 143 Physicians also may be required
to complete CBCs outside of the licensing process. Residency programs, upon
selection of incoming residents, may require a CBC. 144 Hospitals may also
require background checks as a condition of credentialing. 145
A CBC should be required in addition to existing self-reporting
requirements. Some physicians who have engaged in criminal conduct do not

“State Board of Medicine” under Board/Commission, then “Medical Physician and Surgeon” under
License Type, and then “Allopathic.”; Criminal Background Check Instructions, TENN. DEP’T.
HEALTH, https://www.tn.gov/health/health-professionals/criminal-background-check/cbc-instruc
tions.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2021); Fingerprinting, TEX. MED. BD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT BD.
STATE BD. OF ACUPUNCTURE EXAM’RS, http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/page/get-fingerprints (last
visited Sept. 15, 2021).
139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-240-106(3) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-305(3)
(2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-67-302.1(1) (West 2018); see also Information for Physicians,
INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT, https://www.imlcc.org/information-for-physicians/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2021) (stating that individuals with a criminal history are not eligible).
140. Participating Medical Schools and Deadlines, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS.,
https://students-residents.aamc.org/applying-medical-school/article/participating-medical-schools
-deadlines/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
141. Id.
142. Criminal Background Check: Search-by-Search Description, ASS’N OF AM. MED.
COLLS., https://students-residents.aamc.org/applying-medical-school/article/criminal-backgroundcheck-search-search-descriptio/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
143. Application Handbook: A Guide for Applicants of Dental, Medical, & Veterinary Schools
in Texas, TEX. MED. & DENTAL SCHLS. APPLICATION SERV. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.tmdsas
.com/ApplicationHandbook.pdf/.
144. Ann Rhodes & Catherine Solow, Implementing a Criminal Background Check Process,
95 J. MED. REGUL., Jun. 1, 2009, at 17, 20.
145. Roshan Patel, Credentialing, STATPEARLS, https://www.statpearls.com/ArticleLibrary/
viewarticle/20108 (last updated Oct. 30, 2021, 12:40 AM).
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disclose it. 146 A CBC will enable the board to promptly discover undisclosed
offenses that would put the public at risk, including those that occurred out-ofstate. 147 For example, the Washington Medical Commission requires a CBC to
determine eligibility for renewal of a medical license while also requiring
licensees to self-report any arrests, convictions, or other determinations or
findings by law enforcement agencies for a criminal offense. 148
A CBC requirement also complements third-party arrest notification
services utilized by some boards. 149 Arrest notification services allow an
authorized entity to receive notification of criminal history information from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for employment, licensing, or certification
purposes. 150 Generally, arrest notification services allow the DOJ to maintain
fingerprints of the respective employees, and in the case of a subsequent arrest,
the DOJ notifies the entity. 151
The model language ensures that SMBs receive complete, timely, and
verified information about criminal charges and actions as part of the process of
license renewal. However, SMBs will still need to take appropriate action based
on the information received. Several highly publicized cases suggest that
physicians continue to practice after arrest, conviction, or other determination
related to criminal conduct that harms patients.152 A review of all physicians
convicted of crimes and disciplined by a SMB or the federal government
between 1990 and 1999 also found that SMBs often impose modest sanctions
even after a criminal conviction. 153

146. See Scott Dance, Report: State Board Overlooked Doctor’s Rape Conviction, BALTIMORE
SUN (Nov. 12, 2014, 10:26 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-dando-oig-report20141112-story.html.
147. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 11–12.
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.064(3), (4) (2008). This self-report of a criminal offense must
be made to the Board within fourteen days of the conviction.
149. McIntosh et al., supra note 22, at 11, 13.
150. See Contract for Subsequent Arrest Notification Service, CAL. DEP’T JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/fingerprints/forms/subarr.pdf (last revised Mar. 2018).
151. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.2(a)(1) (West 2019).
152. See, e.g., Mayfield et al., supra note 7; Robbins, supra note 18.
153. Azza AbuDagga et al., Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1039 U.S. Physicians Reported to
the National Practitioner Data Bank for Sexual Misconduct, 2003–2013, 11 PLOS ONE, Feb. 3,
2016, at 1, 10; Paul Jung et al., U.S. Physicians Disciplined for Criminal Activity, 16 HEALTH
MATRIX: J. L.–MED. 335, 341, 344 (2006).
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5. Establish Preponderance of the Evidence as the Standard of Proof in
Disciplinary Actions
Model Language
Section 104. Burden of Proof
(1) In any disciplinary hearing, a finding of the Board must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Existing Approaches
As shown in Table 4, thirty-five states provide that the standard of proof or
level of evidence required for the board to find a violation has occurred is
“preponderance of the evidence,” either for all or a subset of violations. Of those
states, only twenty-six have established the standard of proof by statute,
regulation, or decision by the highest state court.
In contrast, thirteen states require “clear and convincing evidence” to find
that a violation has occurred for at least some types of violations. A few states
have more than one standard of proof for physician disciplinary matters. For
example, Arizona requires its medical board prove a disciplinary violation with
“clear and convincing evidence,” except for proceedings involving sexual
misconduct. 154 In Florida, proceedings are generally subject to a preponderance
of the evidence standard, but revocation of a license requires clear and
convincing evidence. 155
Commentary
A standard of proof is the level of evidence required for the board or other
decisionmakers to find that a violation has occurred. 156 Professional
organizations and experts have recommended that SMBs use preponderance of
the evidence as the standard of proof in disciplinary actions. 157 This would mean,
for example, that a board could base its finding on evidence indicating it was
“more likely than not” that a violation took place, or evidence “sufficient to
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” 158
Physician disciplinary actions are civil proceedings, and the preponderance of
the evidence standard is used in most civil cases, where a typical jury instruction

154. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1451.04 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(27)(aa)
(2021).
155. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(3) (2020).
156. Standard of Proof, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
157. GUIDELINES FOR THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF A STATE MEDICAL AND
OSTEOPATHIC BOARD, supra note 42, at 11, 13, 39; WOLFE ET AL., supra note 19.
158. Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Colorado v.
New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
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is to find for a party that has stronger evidence, “however slight the edge may
be.” 159
In contrast, clear and convincing proof generally means evidence that is
sufficient to find the allegations “highly probable or reasonably certain.”160 The
clear and convincing standard is typically used in claims involving fraud or
“some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing.” 161 Clear and convincing is a higher
standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence, but both require less
certainty than the more familiar standard in criminal cases, “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 162
The standard of proof used must satisfy due process requirements. Most
courts to examine the issue have held that use of the preponderance of the
evidence standard in medical disciplinary actions satisfies due process
requirements. 163 However, some courts have held otherwise. For example, in
Painter v. Abels, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found the “preponderance
standard fails to protect” the plaintiff because they could lose their livelihood,
reputation, medical license, and protected property right. 164 Further, the court
found the risk of error is high because the agency takes part in all steps, acting
as the investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker. 165 The court held that the
board should apply the clear and convincing standard rather than preponderance
of the evidence standard to decrease the chance of error. 166
Adherence to an unnecessarily high standard of proof may impair a SMB’s
ability to protect the public from egregious wrongdoing by physicians.
Inconsistent application of the standard of proof may expose the SMB to
159. Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Colorado,
467 U.S. at 316.
160. Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Colorado,
467 U.S. at 316.
161. Nguyen v. State Dep’t Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 694 (Wash.
2001); see also Foster v. Bd. of Dentistry, 1986-NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 103 N.M. 776 (board of dentistry
not required to use clear and convincing evidence standard rather than preponderance of evidence
in determining that dentist’s license should be suspended).
162. Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
163. See Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1991); Rucker v. Mich,
Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); In re Grimm, 635 A.2d 456, 461 (N.H.
1993); In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 16–17 (N.J. 1982); Anonymous (M–156–90) v. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 496 S.E.2d 17, 19–20 (S.C. 1998); Gandhi v. State Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d
295, 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu,
2007 ND 9, ¶ 27, 726 N.W.2d 216, 230.
164. Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 2000); see Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 697 (holding it
is much more than just loss of a job, but the physician’s “substantial interest to practice within his
profession, his reputation, his livelihood, and his financial and emotional future” to show the
minimum standard of proof for physician disciplinary action must be higher than mere
preponderance, thus clear and convincing was selected).
165. Painter, 998 P.2d at 941.
166. Id.
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physician claims of unequal treatment. Consideration of legal requirements, like
the standard of proof, should be coupled with education for SMB members to
understand and consistently apply the standard of proof and other legal
requirements. 167
It is also important to distinguish the board’s standard of proof in
disciplinary proceedings from the judicial standard of review in state court. If a
physician pursues an appeal in state court, the court reviews the administrative
agency’s decision to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. 168 As
stated above, substantial evidence means there is adequate evidence to support
the conclusion. 169 When the courts review agency interpretations, the Supreme
Court directs them to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations
unless the agency’s position is “plainly erroneous.” 170
V. CONCLUSION
SMBs play an important role in protecting the public from harmful
physicians. More public, professional, and scholarly attention is needed to
identify and assess legal policy tools that would make SMBs more effective at
protecting patients in egregious cases. This Article offers specific, expertinformed, and actionable legal and policy tools in the form of model language
with commentary for five high-impact statutory provisions that address board
composition and function, reporting to the board, and adjudication of
disciplinary matters. The model provisions and commentary are intended to
serve as a new resource for SMBs, state legislatures, and other policymakers to
encourage and support examination of existing medical practice acts in order to
improve SMB function and better protect patients from harmful physicians.

167. HOROWITZ, supra note 80, at 187–88 (recommending increased training for SMB
members on the statutory requirements governing the disciplinary process and the need to provide
justifications for decisions and to “understand the elementary rules of evidence and due-process
requirements”).
168. See sources cited supra note 73.
169. Substantial Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
170. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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TABLE 1. STATE LAWS THAT ADDRESS GENDER DIVERSITY AND RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DIVERSITY OF SMB MEMBERSHIP 171
Gender
Diversity

Racial/
Ethnic
Diversity

Requirement

Alabama

X

X

“Each member of the commission
shall be a citizen of this state and the
membership of the commission shall
be inclusive and reflect the racial,
gender, geographic, urban/rural, and
economic diversity of the state.”
ALA CODE § 34-24-310(a) (2009).

Arkansas

X

X

“The purposes of this subchapter are
to: (1) Provide appointment
recommendations for Arkansas state
boards and commissions that license
or otherwise regulate health-related
professions to ensure board and
commission compositions that reflect
the diversity of the State of
Arkansas” ARK. CODE ANN. § 1780-301(1) (2009).

State

“The appointing authorities for state
health-related agencies, boards, and
commissions shall consider
appointment recommendations
submitted by minority health-related
professional associations.” ARK.
CODE ANN. § 17-80-302(a) (2009).
Iowa

X

171. As of July 1, 2021.

“All appointive boards,
commissions, committees, and
councils of the state established by
the Code, if not otherwise provided
by law, shall be gender balanced.”
IOWA CODE § 69.16A(1) (2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

40

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

Louisiana

[Vol. 15:7

X

“At least every other member
appointed from a list provided for in
this Paragraph shall be a minority
appointee. Nothing in this Paragraph
shall preclude consecutive minority
appointments from lists provided for
in this Paragraph.” LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1263(B) (2018).

Maryland

X

X

“To the extent practicable, the
members appointed to each health
occupations board authorized to
issue a license or certificate under
this article shall reasonably reflect
the geographic, racial, ethnic,
cultural, and gender diversity of the
State.” MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
OCC. § 1-214 (West 2010).

Missouri

X

X

“When making appointments to the
boards . . . the governor shall take
affirmative action to appoint women
and members of minority groups.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 324.021 (2008).

North
Carolina

X

X

“Each appointing and nominating
authority shall endeavor to see,
insofar as possible, that its
appointees and nominees to the
Board reflect the composition of the
State with regard to gender, ethnic,
racial, and age composition.” N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-2(a1) (2019).
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Tennessee

“Appointments to boards,
commissions, committees, and
councils of the state established by
this code, if not otherwise provided
by law, should be gender balanced to
the extent possible and to the extent
that appointees are qualified to serve
on those boards, commissions,
committees, and councils. Any
appointment in accordance with this
section should be made in a manner
that strives to seek gender balance
based on the numbers of each gender
belonging to the group from which
appointments are made.” N.D. CENT.
CODE § 54-06-19 (1989).

X

Oregon

X

41

X

“In selecting the members of the
board, the Governor shall strive to
balance the representation on the
board according to geographic areas
of this state and ethnicity.” OR. REV.
STAT. § 677.235(2)(d)(A) (2019). 172

X

“In making appointments to the
board, the governor shall, to the
extent feasible, strive to ensure the
full twelve-member board is
composed of at least one (1) person
who is sixty (60) years of age or
older, one (1) person who is female
and one (1) person who is an
African-American.” TENN. CODE
ANN. § 63-6-102(c) (2012).

172. An updated version of the section took effect January 1, 2022. There is no change to the
language addressing diversity.
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TABLE 2. STATE LAWS THAT AUTHORIZE PENALTIES AGAINST HEALTH CARE
ENTITIES FOR FAILURE TO REPORT UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY
PHYSICIANS 173
Amount per
violation

Requirement

Alabama

≤$2,500

ALA. CODE § 34-24-59(a)
(2002) (for failure on the part of
a chief administrative officer of
a hospital to file a report).

California

$10,001-$50,000

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 805(l) (West 2021); CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 805.8(e) (West
2021); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 805.01(g) (West 2018) (up to
$100,000 per willful violation).

Delaware

$10,001-$50,000

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1731A(i) (2010) ($10,000 for
the first violation, and $50,000
for each subsequent violation).

State

D.C.

≤$2,500

D.C. CODE § 7-161(d)(2) (2009).

Florida

≤$2,500

FLA. STAT. § 459.016(2) (1998)
(not to exceed $1,000 for the
first offense, and not exceed
$5,000 for subsequent offenses;
FLA. STAT. § 458.337(2) (1998)
(required to report to the
Division of Health Quality
Assurance).

Indiana

$5,001-$10,000

IND. CODE § 16-21-3-1 (1993).

Kansas

*

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,121(c)
(2001) (not to exceed $1,000 per
day for each day thereafter that
the incident is not reported).

Maine

$2,501-$5,000

ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2506 (2013).

Maryland

$2,501-$5,000

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC.
§ 14-413(e)(1) (West 2020).

173. As of July 1, 2021.
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Massachusetts

$5,001-$10,000

Minnesota

Not specified

Nebraska

≤$2,500

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, §
53B (1996).
MINN. STAT. § 147.111 (2019).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1,127(3)
(2011) (up to $500 per violation
for the first offense, up to $1,000
per violation for subsequent
offenses).

Nevada

$5,001-$10,000

NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.307(5)
(2015).

New Jersey

$2,501-$5,000

N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2H12.2b(f) (2012); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 26:2H-14 (2003) (not more
than $5,000 for each day in
violation of reporting
requirement).

New Mexico

$5,001-$10,000

N.M. CODE R. § 16.10.10.11
(LexisNexis 2018).

North Carolina

Oregon

≤$2,500

$5,001-$10,000

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.13(a2)
(2019) (up to $250 for the first
violation, and up to $500 for
each subsequent violation).
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 677.415(10)(a) (2010).

Pennsylvania

≤$2,500

63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 422.4(f) (West 1986).

Rhode Island

≤$2,500

5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-25
(1986); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 537-9 (1998).

Vermont

$5,001-$10,000

43

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1317(f)
(2020) (a hospital that employs
from one to four physicians is
subject to a penalty of up to
$5,000, while a hospital that
employs five or more physicians
is subject to a penalty of
$10,000).
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Virginia
Washington

West Virginia

Wyoming

$10,001-$50,000
≤$2,500
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VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12400.6(E) (2021).
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.41.210(4) (2008)174 (up to
$500 per violation).

$5,001-$10,000

W. VA. CODE R. § 30-3-14
(2018) (penalties range from
$1,000 to $10,000).

≤$2,500

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-26409(d) (2003) (up to $100 per
violation).

174. An updated version of the section will take effect July 1, 2022. There is no change to the
basis for or amount of the penalty for failure to report.
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TABLE 3. STATE LAWS THAT REQUIRE CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS AT
INITIAL APPLICATION, RENEWAL, OR REINSTATEMENT OF MEDICAL LICENSE 175
State

Initial

Renewal

Alabama

X

Arizona

X

Arkansas

X

California

X

Delaware

X

X

District of
Columbia

X

X

Florida

X

X

Reinst.

Source

X

ALA. ADMIN. CODE r.
540-X-3-.05 (2008); ALA.
CODE § 34-24-337(d)
(2021).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1422(A)(12) (2017).

X

X

ARK. CODE ANN. § 1795-306(a) (2005);
060.00.001 ARK. CODE R.
§ 39(E) (LexisNexis
2020). 176

X

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 144(a), (b)(14) (West
2021); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 2082(g) (West
2018).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 1720(b)(6), (h), (i),
1723(e) (2017) (ongoing
review of criminal
background information).

X

D.C. CODE § 3-1205.22(a)
(2021); D.C. Mun. Regs.
tit. 17, § 8501.1, .4, .5
(2018).
FLA. STAT. § 458.311(g)
(2008); FLA. STAT.
§ 456.039(4)(a)-(b)
(2015).

175. As of July 1, 2021.
176. The Westlaw database reflects an updated version and location of this rule. 007.33.24
ARK. CODE R. § 39(E). There is no change to the requirement of criminal background checks.
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Idaho

X

IDAHO CODE § 541810(1) (2019); IDAHO
CODE § 54-1811(2)
(2019).

Illinois

X

225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/9.7 (2011); see also
225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/9(F), 60/19(H)
(2014). 177

Indiana

X

IND. CODE § 25-1-1.14(c) (2014).

Iowa

X

X

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r.
653-8.4(1)(a), (f) (2017).

Kansas

X

X

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6528,129(a) (2008).

Kentucky

X

Louisiana

X

X

X

LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1277 (2018).

Maryland

X

X

X

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
OCC. § 14-307(i) (West
2020); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH OCC. § 14308.1(b) (West 2015);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
OCC. § 14-316(g)(1)
(West 2020). 178

Massachusetts

X

X

Michigan

X

201 KY. ADMIN. REGS.
9:210(1) (2020).

243 MASS. CODE REGS.
2.04(8) (2021).
X

MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.16174(3) (2013);
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.16245(8) (2015).

177. An updated version of the section took effect January 1, 2022. There is no change to the
requirement of criminal background checks.
178. An updated version of the section will take effect October 1, 2022. There is no change to
the requirement of criminal background checks.
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Minnesota

X

X

MINN. STAT. § 214.075(a)
(2019).

Mississippi

X

X

MISS. CODE ANN. § 7325-3 (2007); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 73-25-14(9)
(2008).

Nebraska

X

NEB. REV. STAT. § 38131(1) (2018).

Nevada

X

NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 630.167(1) (2017); see
also NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 622.530(1)(g) (2019).

New
Hampshire

X

New Jersey

X

New Mexico

X

North Carolina

Ohio

X

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 329:11-a(I) (2018).

X

X

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:129 (West 2005); see also
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
13:35-3.13 (2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:1-30(e)
(West 2005).

X

X

N.M. CODE R.
§ 16.10.2.18 (LexisNexis
2013); N.M. CODE R.
§ 16.10.7.9 (LexisNexis
2009); N.M. CODE R.
§ 16.10.7.18 (LexisNexis
2009).

X

X

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9011(b) (2019); 21 N.C.
ADMIN. CODE
32B.1303(a)(16) (2019);
21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
32B.1350(b)(7)–(8)
(2019).

X

X

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4776.02(A) (West
2017); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4731.281(C)
(West 2019).
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OR. REV. STAT.
§ 677.265(9) (2014); OR.
ADMIN. R. 847-0200150(7) (2016).

Oregon

X

South Carolina

X

S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-4736(A) (2006).

South Dakota

X

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 36-4-11.1 (2018).

Utah

X

UTAH CODE ANN. § 5867-302.1(1) (West 2018).

Vermont

X

X

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1353(8) (2021).

Washington

X

X

WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.130.064(2)–(3), (6)
(2008); WASH. REV.
CODE § 18.130.064(5)
(2008) (requires annual
review of random
representative sample of
licensees).

West Virginia

X

W. VA. CODE R. § 11-1A8.1 (2019).

Wyoming

X

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3326-202(b)(xvi) (2019).
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TABLE 4. STATE LAWS THAT ADDRESS STANDARD OF EVIDENCE IN SMB
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 179
State

Preponderance
of evidence

Alaska

X

Arizona

X

Arkansas

X

California

Clear and
convincing
evidence

Source

Odom v. State Div. of
Corps., 421 P.3d 1, 7
(Alaska 2018) (assumes for
the purposes of the
decision that the
preponderance of the
evidence standard applies).
X

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1451.04 (2018); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 321401(27)(aa) (2021)
(exception for proceedings
involving sexual
misconduct).
C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 247
S.W.3d 870, 874–875
(Ark. 2007).

X

Ettinger v. Bd. of Med.
Quality Assurance, 185
Cal. Rptr. 601, 603 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982).

Colorado

X

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25127(1) (1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-4-105(7)
(2019).

Connecticut

X

Jones v. Conn. Med.
Examining Bd., 72 A.3d
1034, 1043 (Conn. 2013).

179. As of July 1, 2021.
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Delaware

X

Sokoloff v. Bd. of Med.
Prac., No. N09A–11–005,
2010 WL 5550692, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct., Aug. 25,
2010).

District of
Columbia

X

Sherman v. Comm’n on
Licensure to Prac. Healing
Art, 407 A.2d 595, 601
(D.C. 1979).

Florida

X

Georgia

X

GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
616-1-2-.21(4) (2020).

Hawaii

X

HAW. CODE R. § 16-20121(d) (LexisNexis 1990).

X

FLA. STAT. § 458.331(3)
(2020) (greater weight of
the evidence); FLA. STAT.
§ 458.331(3) (2020) (clear
and convincing for license
revocation).

Idaho

X

Laurino v. Bd. of Pro.
Discipline of Idaho State
Bd. of Med., 51 P.3d 410,
415 (Idaho 2002).

Illinois

X

Vuagniaux v. Dep’t of Pro.
Regul., 802 N.E.2d 1156,
1163, 1173 (Ill. 2003).

Iowa

Kansas

Eaves v. Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 467 N.W.2d 234,
237 (Iowa 1991); State v.
Brown, 218 Iowa 166, 170
(1934), 253 N.W. 836, 838
(Iowa 1934).

X

*

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 652836(c) (2020) (clear and
convincing by two-thirds
of voting members to rebut
license revocation based on
conviction of a felony or
class A misdemeanor).
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Kentucky

X

Parrish v. Ky. Bd. of Med.
Licensure, 145 S.W.3d
401, 411 (Ky. Ct. App.
2004).

Louisiana

X

LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1285.2(C) (2018).

Maryland

X

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH
OCC. § 14-405(b)(2) (West
2017).

Michigan

X

Rucker v. Mich. Bd. of
Med., 360 N.W.2d 154,
155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).

Minnesota

X

MINN. R. 1400.7300
(2021); In re Wang, 441
N.W.2d 488, 492 (Minn.
1989).

Mississippi

X

MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-2527 (2009).

Missouri
Montana

X

MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-1311(1) (2007).

X

Nebraska

MO. REV. STAT.
§ 334.099(1)(8) (2011).

X

Davis v. Wright, 503
N.W.2d 814, 819 (Neb.
1993).

Nevada

X

NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 630.346(2) (2017).

New
Hampshire

X

N.H. CODE ADMIN. R.
ANN. Med 206.10(a)
(2007).

New Jersey

X

In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 12
(N.J. 1982).

New Mexico

X

Foster v. Bd. of Dentistry
of State of N.M., 714 P.2d
580, 582 (N.M. 1986).
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New York

X

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 230(10)(f) (McKinney
2020).

North
Carolina

X

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B25.1(a) (2015).

North
Dakota

X

N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-3246(5) (2001).

Ohio

X

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.22(G)(1) (West
2021).

Oklahoma

X

Bottles v. State ex rel.
Okla. State Bd. of Med.
Licensure & Supervision,
917 P.2d 471, 472 (Okla.
1996); Robinson v. State
ex rel. Okla. State Bd. of
Med. Licensure &
Supervision, 916 P.2d
1390, 1393 (Okla. 1996).

Oregon

X

Gallant v. Bd. of Med.
Examiners, 974 P.2d 814,
816, 818 (Or. Ct. App.
1999) (interpreting OR.
REV. STAT. § 183.450(5)
(1999)).

Pennsylvania

X

Oakes v. Bureau of Pro. &
Occupational Affs., State
Bd. of Osteopathic Med.,
No. 2416 C.D.2011, 2012
WL 8704931, at *2 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Oct. 23,
2012); Starr v. State Bd. of
Med., 720 A.2d 183, 191
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
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Rhode Island

X

Mills v. Nolan, No. PC 014153, 2003 WL 22790706,
at *10 (R.I. Super Ct. Nov.
13, 2003); Miele v. Bd. of
Med. Licensure &
Discipline, C.A. 90-1930,
1991 WL 789899, at *2
(R.I. Super Ct. 1991).

South
Carolina

X

Anonymous (M-156-90) v.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
496 S.E.2d 17, 20 (S.C.
1998) (interpreting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-23-600
(2019)).

South
Dakota

X

Tennessee

X

TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
1360-04-01-.02 (1990).

Texas

X

Granek v. Tex. State Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs, 172 S.W.3d
761, 777 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005).

Vermont

X

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1354(c) (2021).

X

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 364-29 (2013); In re Setliff,
2002 S.D. 58, ¶ 13, 645
N.W.2d 601, 605 (clear
and convincing standard
for license revocation).

Washington

X

Nguyen v. State, Dep’t of
Health Med. Quality
Assurance Comm’n, 29
P.3d 689, 697 (Wash.
2001).

West
Virginia

X

W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(b)
(2018).

Wisconsin

X

WIS. STAT. § 440.20(3)
(2018).
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Wyoming

X

X
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-26407(b) (2003); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 33-26-406(c)
(2009) (preponderance for
petition to regain license
privileges).

